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KATE M. BUERER

The Sex-Trafficked Plaintiff’s True Identity in Civil
Suits: Pre-Trial Protective Orders
ABSTRACT
Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and its
subsequent reauthorization acts to combat human trafficking, protect
victims, and enable the civil prosecution of offenders. Under 18
U.S.C. § 1595, a sex-trafficking victim may bring a civil action against the
trafficker or against any person who “knowingly benefits, financially or by
receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person
knew or should have known has engaged” in sex-trafficking. Almost two
decades after this Act was passed, the first civil suit against the hospitality
industry was filed by a sex-trafficking survivor requesting relief in the form
of $9,999,000 from ten different hotels under 18 U.S.C. § 1595. Since that first
case was filed, sex-trafficking survivors have filed over a dozen civil suits in
federal district courts across the United States by sex-trafficking survivors
seeking recompense from corporations that allegedly profited from the
trafficking.
A sex-trafficked plaintiff faces significant hurdles when attempting to gain
recompense from a corporation. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
the corporation’s complicity in her trafficking and has a distinct lack of
financial and legal resources compared to the defendant corporations. The
plaintiff faces another hurdle in the form of potential social, financial, or
physical harm that may arise if her identity as a sex-trafficking survivor is
disseminated throughout her community. Most of the sex-trafficking
survivors that filed civil suits against corporations requested the courts allow
them to proceed under pseudonyms in court documents. Many plaintiffs also
requested a protective order restricting defendants’ disclosure of the
plaintiff’s identity during discovery to the greatest extent possible without
prejudicing the defendants’ ability to litigate the case.
The federal district court decisions in response to these protective orders
have varied. Most courts have allowed the plaintiff to proceed under a
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pseudonym in court documents. One federal district court issued a protective
order restricting the defendants’ disclosure of the plaintiff’s true identity to
only those persons that had a genuine need for that knowledge during
litigation of the case. However, a different federal district court denied the
plaintiff’s request for a modification that would restrict the defendants’
disclosure of the plaintiff’s true identity during discovery. The differences in
the district court decisions can be attributed to differing types of protective
orders, differing requests for protective orders, differing precedent within the
circuits, and a lack of clear guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court on
a civil plaintiff’s right to access the courts to pursue a remedy made available
by Congress. This Comment examines the cases underlying and guiding the
various circuit precedents before proposing a model protective order.
The goal of the model protective order is to prevent the plaintiff’s sextrafficking perpetrators from obtaining current information about her
identity, contact information, location of residence, or other private
information while also safeguarding the defendants’ right to present a full
and fair defense by allowing defendants to disclose the plaintiff’s identity
when necessary. The defendants may prove necessity through agreement
among the parties, a contested motion to the court, or a court-appointed
master. This Comment recommends court appointment of a master willing
to serve pro bono under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 to further the just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of the case under the restrictions of the
model protective order while allowing both plaintiff and defendants to be
fully heard by the court.

AUTHOR
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J.D. Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2022); B.S., Political Science,
magna cum laude, Liberty University (1998).
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COMMENT
THE SEX-TRAFFICKED PLAINTIFF’S TRUE IDENTITY IN CIVIL
SUITS: PRE-TRIAL PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Kate M. Buerer†
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the American people have become increasingly aware of
the sex-trafficking epidemic across the nation. This rising awareness stems in
part from increased reporting on sex-trafficking related crimes during and
prior to large sporting and entertainment events and the resultant arrests.1
The arrest of Jeffrey Epstein in 20192 and the recently concluded trial of his
associate, Ghislaine Maxwell,3 have also increased public awareness. While
increased public awareness, criminal investigations, and criminal
prosecutions undoubtedly remove individual traffickers and trafficking rings
from the streets, the sex-trafficking industry continues to be big business.4
The sex-trafficking industry allegedly uses and exploits legitimate businesses,
such as online advertising sites and hotels or motels, to facilitate and conceal
illegal trade in adults and children.5

†
Notes & Comments Editor, Liberty University Law Review, Volume 16; J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2022); B.S., Political Science, magna cum laude, Liberty
University (1998).
1
Richard Lapchick, The Super Bowl Remains Target for Human Trafficking, ESPN (Jan.
31, 2020), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/28607449/the-super-bowl-remains-targethuman-trafficking (reporting consistent spike of sex-trafficking incidents in the U.S. during
January and February—reported incidents in 2019 equaled 450 in January, 540 in February,
but 140 in March).
2
Jonathan Dienst, Sarah Fitzpatrick, & Tom Winter, Billionaire Sex Offender Jeffrey
Epstein Arrested for Alleged Sex Trafficking, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/billionaire-sex-offender-jeffrey-epstein-arrested-alleged-sex-trafficking-n1027126 (July
7, 2019, 8:33 AM).
3
Tom Winter, Erik Ortiz, & Sarah Fitzpatrick, Ghislaine Maxwell Convicted of Federal
Sex Trafficking Charges for Role in Jeffrey Epstein’s Abuses, NBC NEWS,
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ghislaine-maxwell-trial-verdict-reached-ghislainemaxwell-sex-traffick-rcna9479 (Dec. 30, 2021, 8:21 AM) (detailing Ms. Maxwell’s conviction
for five of six federal counts charged).
4
Lapchick, supra note 1 (stating human trafficking activity generated approximately
$150 billion dollars annually).
5
See id.
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Congress has passed numerous acts and statutes creating civil remedies
for sex-trafficked victims.6 However, sex-trafficking survivors only recently
began to bring lawsuits against third-party corporations that profited from
the sex-trafficking industry through the trafficker’s use of the corporations’
accommodations.7 Since 2019, sex-trafficking survivors have filed more than
a dozen lawsuits in federal district courts across the nation against
corporations that allegedly profited from sex-trafficking ventures being
conducted through use of the corporations’ legitimate businesses.8 Plaintiffs
generally allege that the corporations knew or should have known the
plaintiffs were being trafficked commercially for sex through use of the
corporations’ advertising websites or guest rooms.
These survivors of sex-trafficking relate heartbreaking stories in their
complaints, including allegations of severe physical abuse, severe
psychological abuse, and coercion to perform sex acts with strangers multiple
times per day.9 They claim hotel employees witnessed beatings, dozens of
men coming and going multiple times a day from one room, and rooms
strewn with used condoms and empty liquor bottles.10 Yet the employees
6
See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7114) (requiring government
action regarding trafficking and providing protection for trafficking victims); Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1466 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 8 U.S.C.) (creating civil remedies for
trafficking victims); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.,
and 8 U.S.C.) (creating private right of action for trafficking victims in 18 U.S.C. § 1595);
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164,
132 Stat. 1253 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595, and 2421A and 47
U.S.C. § 230) (clarifying in 18 U.S.C. § 2421A that enforcement is permitted against
providers and users of computer services engaged in the sexual exploitation of children or
sex-trafficking).
7
Rachel Rothberg, Risky Business: Holding Hotels Accountable for Sex Trafficking, 38
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 285 (2019) (filing of first civil TVPA suit against the hospitality
industry in March 2019 by a sex-trafficking survivor).
8
Emma Kennedy, Levin Papantonio Rafferty Goes After Hotels, Porn Sites with Human
Trafficking Lawsuits, PENSACOLA NEWS J.,
https://www.pnj.com/story/news/crime/2021/10/11/pensacola-law-firm-levin-papantoniorafferty-hotels-porn-sites-human-trafficking-lawsuits/6041855001/ (Oct. 11, 2021, 6:08 AM).
9
Complaint at 4, 18, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00849 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 8, 2019) [hereinafter M.A. Complaint]; Complaint at 2, 17–19, A.D. v. Wyndham
Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00120 (E.D. Va. dismissed Oct. 8, 2021) [hereinafter
A.D. Complaint]; Second Amended Complaint for Damages at 4–5, 56, 67–69, M.L. v.
Craigslist, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-06153 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2021) [hereinafter Craigslist
Complaint].
10
M.A. Complaint, supra note 9, at 18–19; A.D. Complaint, supra note 9, at 18–19;
Craigslist Complaint, supra note 9, at 62, 67–69.
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failed to report suspicions of trafficking to the authorities.11 In pressing their
suits, many of these sex-trafficking survivors have requested protective
orders from the courts to allow them to proceed under a pseudonym and to
limit disclosure of personal identifying information to the public and their
alleged traffickers.12
In this Comment, Section II explains the legal background under which
courts and parties operate while determining how best to reconcile the
plaintiff’s interest in accessing the court without fear of harm, the defendant’s
interest in presenting a full and fair defense, and the public’s interest in open
judicial proceedings. Section III provides context by examining how three
federal districts courts in Ohio, Virginia, and Washington state have
considered and ruled on protective orders shielding the plaintiff’s identity
during discovery. Finally, Section IV reconciles the standards used and
proposes a model protective order shielding the plaintiff’s identity while also
allowing for the defendant’s need to investigate the allegation. This proposed
model protective order can be used as a template from which parties can craft
a stipulated protective order or which a court can edit to fit the particular
needs of the case before it.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP or Rules) define the
parameters of civil litigation in the federal court system. Each Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP or Rule) serves a specific purpose in civil litigation,
but parties and the court combine those individual Rules to resolve the
complex problems that arise within a diverse range of civil cases. In the realm
of discovery, FRCP 26 provides the general rules of discovery under which
the parties must operate.13 Along with FRCP 37, FRCP 26 also provides
guidelines for court orders issued to protect or compel discovery under
certain circumstances.14 FRCP 1 defines the purpose of the Rules which guide
11

M.A. Complaint, supra note 9, at 18–19; A.D. Complaint, supra note 9, at 18–19;
Craigslist Complaint, supra note 9, at 62–65 (alleging that not only did employees not report
suspicions of trafficking to police, but that the manager of one Motel 6 attempted to solicit
commercial sex acts from M.L. while she was a minor); id. at 66 (alleging employees told a
teenage M.L. to be more discrete in her sexual activities or she would be forced out of the
premises); id. at 68.
12
Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order and Leave to Proceed Anonymously with
Memorandum in Support at 1, A.D. v. Wyndham, No. 4:19-CV-00120 [hereinafter A.D.
Protective Order Request].
13
FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
14
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
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the parties and the court in their use of the Rules.15 Congress granted the
federal courts broad discretion to mediate discovery disputes between
parties,16 and FRCP 53 provides a potential means of resolving these
disputes—an appointed master.17 A court-appointed master may reconcile
the demanding standards of FRCP 26 within the overarching purpose
defined in FRCP 1.
1.

FRCP 1: The Scope and Purpose of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure

The Supreme Court of the United States declared that, in the pursuit of
fulfilling the purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil trials,
deposition-discovery rules should “be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment.”18 But those provisions must be read in light of FRCP 1 which
declares the purpose of the entirety of the Rules.19 Rule 1 states that the parties
and the court should “construe[], administer[], and employ[]” the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”20 Thus, both the parties and
the court should work together towards the goal of acquiring the necessary
information in the most efficient and efficacious manner possible to achieve
the ultimate disposition of the action or proceeding.
2.

FRCP 26: General Provisions Governing Discovery

Courts throughout the United States “routinely issue protective orders to
prevent litigants from disseminating pretrial discovery information.”21
Protective orders shield information that would otherwise fall within the
scope of discovery under FRCP 26(b).22 The scope of discovery allowed under
FRCP 26(b) is broad—“any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”23 This
protection may take the form of forbidding the discovery of the information
altogether or forbidding the disclosure of the information discovered.24
15

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
17
FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
18
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
19
Id.
20
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
21
Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order Litigation,
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2014).
22
See id. at 1784.
23
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
24
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A).
16
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Many protective orders shield sensitive discovery information common to
a specific type of case. Parties frequently present a stipulated protective order
to the court based on the court’s published model protective order. In
corporate civil cases parties frequently agree on the labels and parameters for
categories of information (such as Confidential or Highly Confidential), how
to designate material as part of those categories, how to challenge
designations by the opposing party, and what responsibility and liability
attaches to each category.25 These stipulated protective orders can be as
specific and detailed as the parties believe necessary for the instant case.
When parties do not agree on the appropriate contours for discovery and
a party wants to protect discovery information, the party desiring protection
must petition the court for a protective order under FRCP 26(c). The motion
must include certification that the moving party has conferred or attempted
to confer in good faith with the other party or parties.26 The court has the
discretion, on a finding of good cause, to issue an order to protect that party
“from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.”27 While FRCP 26(c)(1) enumerates a long list of prospective actions
the court may order, it is an inclusive list that does not limit the creativity of
the court in solving the specific issue or issues implicated by the instant case.28
a.

History of discovery

In 1970, the Advisory Committee (Committee) rearranged the discovery
rules in order to establish FRCP 26 as the rule governing general discovery.29
The Committee noted that the powers conferred under new Rule 26(c) to
regulate or prevent discovery of otherwise discoverable information have
“always been freely exercised” by courts in situations not susceptible to
governance by precise rules.30 Thus, the Committee explicitly recognized that
a given case may have specific needs that require the court to craft discovery
orders to address those specific needs.
The breadth of discovery allowed under FRCP 26(b) led to excessive
discovery requests on the one hand and attempted evasion of or resistance to
reasonable discovery requests on the other.31 The Committee expressed
25

See N. DIST. OF CAL., Model Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly
Sensitive Confidential Information and/or Trade Secrets,
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/forms/model-protective-orders/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
26
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
30
Id.
31
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
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concern about the impact these practices were having on the judicial system,
especially by frustrating the “fundamental goal of the ‘just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.’”32 As part of the effort to
encourage parties to make reasonable use of the discovery process and not
overburden the court system with unnecessary requests to mediate discovery
disputes, the Committee revised FRCP 26(c) to include the requirement that
the moving party must certify the parties met and conferred in good faith
prior to requesting court intervention.33 In 2015, the Committee further
attempted to restrict discovery abuse by revising the definition of the general
scope of discovery in FRCP 26(b)(1) to “any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case.”34 Courts determine proportionality to the needs of the case by
considering six enumerated factors—(1) “the importance of the issues at
stake in the action,” (2) “the amount in controversy,” (3) “the parties’ relative
access to relevant information,” (4) “the parties’ resources,” (5) “the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues,” and (6) “whether the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”35
b.

Historical use of protective orders

All of these revisions, along with others, were made in an attempt “‘to deal
with the problem of overdiscovery’” and “‘to encourage judges to be more
aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse.’”36 The
Committee noted that many courts identify and discourage discovery
overuse by issuing protective orders under Rule 26(c), but it also noted that
“district judges have been reluctant to limit the use of the discovery
devices.”37 It remains the province of the district court to mediate discovery
disputes between parties and carefully consider motions for protective orders
to achieve the goal of the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of
the case.38

32

Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
34
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015
amendment.
35
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
36
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment).
37
Id.
38
FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
33
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FRCP 53: Providing for Masters to Resolve Specific Types of
Disputes

FRCP 53 carefully describes the procedures a court must follow when
appointing a master, the scope of a master’s responsibility, and the
responsibility of the court in response to the master’s decisions.39 The court
may appoint a master to perform a specific list of tasks, one of which is to
“address pretrial and posttrial matters that cannot be effectively and timely
addressed by an available district judge or magistrate judge of the district.”40
When choosing to appoint a master, “the court must consider the fairness of
imposing the likely expenses on the parties and must protect against
unreasonable expense or delay.”41 Before the master is appointed, “the court
must give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.”42 Any party or
the court may suggest candidates; however, any candidate that has a
relationship to the parties must be disqualified unless the parties mutually
consent to the appointment with the court’s approval.43 The court must
follow the strictures laid out in FRCP 53(b)(2)–(3) as to the contents of the
appointing order and the issuance procedures.44
The master, once appointed, must follow the strictures of the appointing
order and maintain prompt communication with the parties and the court.45
The appointing court also has the responsibility to review party objections to
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and procedural rulings made by the
master.46 By using an appointed master, the court can ensure the parties have
access to a neutral decision-maker operating under the auspices of the court
having jurisdiction over the case, but who has greater availability and time to
carefully consider delicate and potentially convoluted discovery requests.
While the court is instructed to consider the expense to the parties when
deciding to appoint a master,47 a master may choose to serve pro bono for a
good cause.48 In cases such as these, where a traumatized complainant
attempts to gain recompense from corporations which she alleges knew or
should have known of the trafficking from which the corporations derived a
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(C).
FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(3).
FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)(1).
Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(2).
FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)(2)–(3).
FED. R. CIV. P. 53(c)–(e).
FED. R. CIV. P. 53(f).
FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(3).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g).
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profit, a master could serve an important public interest. Thus, use of a
master may conserve judicial resources, expedite resolution of discovery
disputes, and reduce party costs while meeting the requirement of a “just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action [or] proceeding.”49
B.

Supreme Court Cases Addressing Protective Orders

The Supreme Court discussed the purpose of discovery, the authority of
the court to restrict discovery, and the broad discretion of the court to guide
discovery in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart50 and Herbert v. Lando.51 The
Court stated the purpose of discovery is to assist in the preparation and
resolution of litigated disputes and to adequately inform litigants in civil
trials.52 The Court recognized both the trial court’s congressionally-granted
authority to restrict abusive discovery practices53 and the trial court’s
resultant broad discretion in granting and crafting the orders to achieve that
end.54
A federal district court may use both protective orders and orders to
compel discovery to guide, restrict, and enforce discovery.55 Protective orders
and orders to compel are two sides of the same coin. A motion for protective
order by one party may result in the court granting that party a protective
order or, if the motion for protective order is denied and the party refuses to
respond to the discovery request at issue, the court may issue an order to
compel the party to respond.56 Alternatively, a court may respond to a motion
to compel discovery by either granting or denying the motion.57 Therefore,
the Court’s discussion of both types of orders are valuable tools by which to
evaluate the role of the trial court in guiding, restricting, and enforcing
discovery during civil litigation.
1.

Protective Orders Applied: Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

In Seattle Times Co., Rhinehart, the spiritual leader of the Aquarian
Foundation, brought an action for damages due to “alleged defamation and

49

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
51
See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
52
See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 34; Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177.
53
Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 34–35; Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176–77.
54
Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 35–36; Herbert, 441 U.S. at 179–80.
55
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)–(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 37; FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s
note to 2006 amendment.
56
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)–(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
57
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
50
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invasions of privacy” against the Seattle Times.58 The Seattle Times
responded by engaging in extensive discovery, including requests for the
Aquarian Foundation’s financial information, donor identity, and
membership list.59 When the Foundation refused to disclose certain financial
information, the names of the Foundation’s members during the preceding
ten years, and the identity of the Foundation’s donors from the last ten years,
the Seattle Times moved for an order compelling discovery.60 The
Foundation not only opposed the motion to compel, but countered with a
motion for a protective order that would prevent the Seattle Times “from
disseminating any information gained through discovery.”61
Upon a specific description of the discoverable information in question
and a factual showing of good cause for protection, the trial court issued a
protective order covering “all information obtained through the discovery
process” that related to the plaintiffs’ finances and the names and addresses
of members or donors.62 “The order prohibited [the Seattle Times] from
publishing, disseminating, or using the information in any way except where
necessary to prepare for and try the case.”63 The trial court reasoned that the
“restriction was necessary to avoid the ‘chilling effect’ that dissemination
would have on ‘a party’s willingness to bring his case to court.’”64
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed this decision by reasoning
that the judicial interest in the integrity of the discovery process is adequate
to sustain the protection of “the confidentiality of information given for
purposes of litigation.”65 The court noted that the plaintiffs had a
“recognizable privacy interest” in the information and that the dissemination
of the information would “understandably result in annoyance,
embarrassment and even oppression.”66
When the Supreme Court of Washington decided the case, it also
recognized a conflict among the holdings and standards of outside circuit
courts.67 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve
58

Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 22–23.
Id. at 24.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 25 (noting the Seattle Times intended to continue publishing articles—using
information gained through discovery—about Rhinehart, the Foundation, and the
litigation).
62
Id. at 26–27.
63
Id. at 27.
64
Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 27.
65
Id. at 28 (quoting Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 690 (1982)).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 28–29.
59

460

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:3

the conflict and affirmed the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision.68 In
the process of addressing the First Amendment issues specific to the case, the
Court made several important statements about protective orders, their
purpose, and their use.
The Court began by recognizing the breadth of allowable discovery under
the FRCP and the local rules based on them.69 The Court stated that broad
discovery “is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and
trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes.”70 Because discovery is so broad,
a trial court needs to have the authority to issue protective orders in order to
mitigate the potential for abuse.71 Parties may attempt to use discovery to
delay trial, increase costs, or invade the privacy interests of parties and nonparties.72 The Court further stated that the government has a substantial
interest in preventing abuse, oppression, and injustice through the
implementation of court processes.73 This potential for abuse and the need to
prevent it justifies the court’s use of protective orders.74
The trial court has broad discretion to determine when to grant a
protective order and how to craft that protective order to meet the needs of
the specific case.75 The court must have this discretion because it is in the
“best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties
affected by discovery.”76 Without a protective order, parties may distribute or
use information gained through discovery for any legal purpose.77 Therefore,
if good cause justifies the order, FRCP 26 allows the court to limit the uses of
information exchanged during discovery.78
2.

Balancing the Various FRCPs: Herbert v. Lando

In Herbert v. Lando, the Supreme Court allowed the public-figure plaintiff
to explore the state of mind of the journalist defendant in a defamation case
for two reasons.79 First, the plaintiff was faced with the heavy burden of

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 36.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 37.
See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175–76 (1979).
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proving “actual malice.”80 Second, the requested discovery would “produce
evidence material to the proof of [that] critical element of [the] cause of
action.”81 Anthony Herbert, a retired Army officer and Vietnam veteran, had
received significant attention from the press in 1969–1970 due to allegations
of misconduct against his superior officers.82 Three years later, the
defendants, including Lando, collaborated to create and broadcast a
television report on Herbert and his allegations.83 Lando also published a
related article in a magazine.84 Herbert alleged the report and article “falsely
and maliciously portrayed him as a liar.”85 In Herbert, the Court focused on
the justice of allowing Herbert to obtain allegedly privileged discovery
materials from Lando.86 It did this by weighing Herbert’s evidentiary burden
and the availability of evidence regarding Lando’s state of mind against
Lando’s alleged privilege of the editorial process.87
The Herbert Court declined to create the evidentiary privilege the
defendants sought.88 The Court reasoned that the purpose of the discovery
rules is to adequately inform the litigants in civil trials.89 Further, the Court
acknowledged concerns about abuse of the discovery process and stated that
district court judges should not neglect their power to restrict discovery as
appropriate in accord with the discovery rules.90
A district court must balance constitutional interests and the parties’
private interests.91 Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion that
“[a]lthough the process of weighing these interests is hardly an exact science,
it is a function customarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of the
law.”92 However, Justice Powell warned that the court should also be aware
of the increasing use of discovery techniques and tactics as a “highly
developed litigation art—one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage
of justice.”93
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 156, 174.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 155–56.
Id. at 156.
Id. (stating Lando’s article was published in Atlantic Monthly magazine).
Herbert, 441 U.S. at 156.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Herbert, 441 U.S. at 178 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 180.
Id. at 179.
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When parties, especially those with deeper pockets, attempt to exploit the
discovery process as a means of harassment or to impose excessive labor or
financial costs on the opposing party or parties, the court has the
responsibility to step in and restrain that exploitation through the use of
devices such as a protective order.94 However, the court makes that decision
after carefully weighing the various interests involved while also seeking a
“just, speedy, and inexpensive determination”95 and ensuring the parties are
protected from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.”96
C.

The Interests to be Balanced

The defendants’ interests addressed in Seattle Times Co. and Herbert, the
freedom to disseminate information learned through discovery97 and the
protection of a journalist’s editorial process,98 are rooted in the First
Amendment. However, the rationale the Court used and the inclusion of the
constitutional concerns in the court’s balancing of interests applies to other
decisions in which the court is called upon to balance competing interests. In
the context of a protective order issued to protect a sex-trafficked plaintiff’s
true identity during pre-trial discovery, the district court balances the
defendants’ right to put on a full and fair defense and the public’s right to
open judicial proceedings against the plaintiff’s right to access the court
without fear of harm.99 Before coming to a decision, the district court should
carefully consider the origin of those rights and the policies upon which they
are based.
1.

The Defendant’s Right to Put on a Full and Fair Defense

A party to a civil trial is afforded a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” its
suit.100 This opportunity arises from the “deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court.”101 A defendant cannot have a
day in court without being able to fully investigate the plaintiff’s claims. Thus,
94

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
96
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
97
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 24–25 (1984).
98
Herbert, 441 U.S. at 155.
99
See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns. Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–99 (1978).
100
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982) (stating that the Court’s
“previous decisions have not specified the source or defined the content of the requirement
that the first adjudication offer a full and fair opportunity to litigate”).
101
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty.,
517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).
95
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the defendant has the right to put on a full and fair defense by using the
discovery process to fully investigate the claims brought by the plaintiff.
The courts zealously guard this right because a full and fair opportunity to
litigate is a significant safeguard against re-litigation of the same claims in the
future.102 As discussed above, the court is granted broad discretion to guide
discovery within the strictures of FRCP 26.103 The courts routinely consider
whether a plaintiff’s request to restrict a defendant’s discovery through a
protective order will unfairly prejudice the defendant’s case.104
2.

The Public’s Right to Open Judicial Proceedings in a Civil
Case

Although the public’s constitutional right of access to criminal
proceedings is firmly established,105 the Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the public’s right to open judicial proceedings in a civil case.
However, inferences may be drawn from the Court’s discussion of the
common law right of access to judicial records in Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc.106 Even in Nixon, the Court did not “undertake to
delineate precisely the contours of the common-law right” because they
assumed the right applied to the evidence at issue in the case.107 The Court
discussed the historical context in which enforcement of the right of access
to judicial records in American decisions has been grounded—the public’s
desire “to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies and in a
newspaper publisher’s intention to publish information concerning the
operation of government.”108 It logically follows that the public’s common-

102

See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys,
Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
103
See discussion supra Sections II.A.2.a., II.B.
104
Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Ests., 596 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir.
2010); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1993); A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels &
Resorts, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250671, at *6–7 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2020); M.L. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250724, at *5–6 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 2020); see Plaintiff
B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011); see id. at 1320 (Moody, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
105
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Ct. of Cal., Cnty. of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)) (recognizing “that members of the public
have a right of access to criminal proceedings secured by the First Amendment”); Waller v.
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44–45 (1984) (recognizing the public’s qualified First Amendment
right to attend a criminal trial and that trial’s voir dire proceeding).
106
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–99.
107
Id. at 599.
108
Id. at 598.
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law right to open judicial proceedings similarly would be grounded in that
same desire and intention.
However, the Nixon Court also stated that “[i]t is uncontested, however,
that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute.”109 Courts
have denied access where access to judicial records may have been sought for
improper purposes.110 These improper purposes include the use of the
records to “gratify private spite or promote public scandal” by publishing
“painful and sometimes disgusting details” of a case, to furnish libelous
statements to the press, or to publish business information that may harm a
litigant.111 The Court determined that the decision to allow or disallow access
to judicial records is “one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”112
The trial court exercises that sound discretion “in light of the relevant facts
and circumstances of the particular case.”113 Similarly, the public’s right to
open judicial proceedings is not absolute. Where open judicial proceedings
only serve to harm the party seeking protection, the court may restrict public
access.114
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of the
public’s common law right of access to open judicial proceedings in civil
cases, the Court has indicated that the presumption of open judicial
proceedings would logically apply to both civil and criminal proceedings.115
The circuit courts have diverged in their interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent and commentary as applied when determining the scope of the
public’s right of access to open judicial proceedings in civil cases. Two circuit
courts of appeals have held that even if the public has a constitutional right
of access to civil records in federal district courts, that constitutional right
does not exceed the public’s common law right of access to those civil records
109

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
111
Id.
112
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599.
113
Id.
114
A court exercises this same sound discretion to restrict public access when it chooses
to close the courtroom during confidential medical testimony. See Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179–80 (6th Cir. 1983) (discussing the contentbased, common-law exception to open judicial proceedings and finding the disclosure of
prejudicial information insufficient “to overcome the strong common law presumption in
favor of public access” to judicial proceedings).
115
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) (noting that
“historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open”); Gannett Co., v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979) (stating “no principled basis upon which a public
right of access to judicial proceedings can be limited to criminal cases if the scope of the right
is defined by the common law rather than the text and structure of the Constitution”).
110
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as discussed in Nixon.116 However, four circuit courts of appeals have held or
stated that the public has a constitutional right of access to civil proceedings
secured by the First Amendment.117 A district court considering the public’s
right of access to civil proceedings has its decision complicated by the lack of
clarity from the Supreme Court, the potential lack of guidance from its circuit
court of appeals, and the disagreement among the circuit courts on the scope
and applicability of both the public’s constitutional and common law right of
access to civil proceedings.
3.

The Plaintiff’s Right to Access the Court Without Fear of
Harm

Unlike the criminal defendant’s procedural due process right to be heard,
a civil plaintiff’s right to access the courts has not been established as a
constitutional right. However, the Supreme Court has extended the due
process right to be heard to civil litigants in a handful of specific
circumstances where state action denied the plaintiff a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. District courts uphold the policy underlying these
decisions—that core principles of civil justice are undermined when plaintiffs
do not have meaningful recourse to the courts—when determining whether
to allow a plaintiff to proceed anonymously. Two Supreme Court cases,
Boddie v. Connecticut118 and M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,119 illustrate the tension

116

See In re Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1338–39 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (holding that the public does not have a constitutional right of access to prejudgment
material before the court); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802–04 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding no constitutional right to copy post-judgment civil judicial records exists, but
finding a common law right to inspect and copy those records).
117
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066–71 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting the
public’s common law right of access to civil proceedings; providing a thorough review of the
history and derivation of the public’s constitutional right of access to civil proceedings; and
holding that the public possesses a constitutional and common law right of access to civil
proceedings which may be limited by the trial court under certain circumstances); Rushford
v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (determining that denial of the
public’s constitutional right of access to civil proceedings requires a more rigorous standard
than the common law rebuttable presumption standard and applying the constitutional
standard to documents connected to a summary judgment motion in a civil case); see Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying
justifications for public right of access to criminal proceedings to civil proceedings); In re
Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308–09 (7th Cir. 1984) (appearing to apply the
presumption of a constitutional right of public access to civil proceedings and holding “that
the presumption of access applies” to hearings and evidence connected to a party’s motion to
terminate).
118
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
119
See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
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underlying the question of whether to extend to civil plaintiffs a
constitutional right of access to the court.
a.

The court as the sole recourse to settle civil disputes

In Boddie v. Connecticut, although the Court specifically stated that it did
“not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all
circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any
individual,”120 the Court reasoned that a divorcing couple’s need for recourse
to the court precluded the state from barring access through imposition of a
fee.121 The Boddie appellants, welfare recipients seeking to divorce, were
denied a divorce due to their inability to pay a statutorily mandated fee.122
Their subsequent request for a judicial waiver of the fee requirement was also
denied.123 The Boddie Court decided that, because the appellants’ sole
recourse for a divorce was through the courts, their plight was similar to that
of “defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum effectively
empowered to settle their disputes.”124 The Court resolved the case under the
due process right to be heard.125
The Court acknowledged it had not had much opportunity to determine
access to the courts as an element of due process in civil cases, because, in
civil cases, resort to the courts is “not usually the only available, legitimate
means” to resolve a dispute.126 The Court reasoned that access to orderly
dispute settlement is central to society, allowing for a level of social
organization and cohesion impossible to achieve without the rule of law.127
Ultimately, it is the courts that implement this regular, orderly process of
dispute settlement in the American judicial system, and due process is central
to this system.128
The Justices disagreed on the grounds of the decision, with some justices
advocating to also base the decision on the principle of equal protection.129
However, the majority agreed that all persons should have access to the relief

120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 376.
See id. at 377–81.
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 375.
Id. at 385–86 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 389 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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accorded by the courts.130 Justice Black, the sole voice of dissent, would have
held that state legislatures may rightfully impose rules limiting or granting
access to the courts.131
Justice Brennan, concurring in part, argued that “[t]he right to be heard in
some way at some time extends to all proceedings entertained by the
courts.”132 He reasoned that the “State has the ultimate monopoly of all
judicial process,” not just procedures granting divorce and thus, if parties to
civil suits cannot successfully settle their dispute out of court, the court
system is the sole remaining recourse for all civil litigants.133 He stated he
“[saw] no constitutional distinction” between the current action “and an
attempt to vindicate any other right arising under federal or state law.”134
Therefore, the right to access the court without barriers should be available
to all civil litigants. The Court did go on to extend the right of access to the
court to civil litigants under similar circumstances.135
The Boddie Court’s rationale—that orderly dispute settlement is central to
society and allows for a level of social cohesion impossible to achieve without
the rule of law—is equally applicable to cases in which a sex-trafficked
plaintiff seeks to hold accountable third-party corporations which allegedly
knew or should have known they were profiting from her trafficking. Because
the third-party corporations did not act as the trafficker and are not natural
persons, they cannot be held criminally responsible in the same manner as
the individual traffickers. A third-party corporation, such as a hotel, may be
held criminally liable for sex-trafficking either through vicarious liability for
acts of its employees violative of federal law or by knowingly receiving
financial benefit from participating in a venture violative of federal law.136
However, federal law enforcement has rarely pursued criminal charges
against third-party corporations.137 The sex-trafficked plaintiff has no means
other than recourse to civil courts by which to obtain restitution and

130

Id. at 386 (Douglas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that courts should not
discriminate against persons based on their ability to pay).
131
Id. at 394 (Black, J., dissenting).
132
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 387–88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
133
Id. at 387.
134
Id.
135
See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (extending the right of civil access to the
courts to a parent denied the opportunity to appeal the termination of her parental rights
because she could not pay the state’s transcript cost).
136
Rothberg, supra note 7, at 280.
137
Id. at 284 (stating only two of 1,217 criminal defendants in federal human trafficking
cases in 2018 were entities).
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encourage third-party corporations to actively attempt to counter sextrafficking occurring on corporate premises.138
b.

The importance of the right that would be denied
without access to the court

Twenty-five years later, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court again addressed the a
civil litigant’s right to access the court—this time based on the importance of
the right that would be denied.139 In M.L.B., the Court determined that a state
may not restrict access to the court due to the litigant’s inability to pay
procedural fees.140 The M.L.B. Court divided more sharply than the Boddie
Court over the applicability of the criminal defendant’s constitutional right
to be heard to a civil litigant’s right to access the court.141
In M.L.B., a Mississippi Chancery Court terminated M.L.B.’s parental
rights to her two minor children.142 M.L.B. attempted to exercise her stategranted right to appeal by timely filing the appeal and paying the one
hundred dollar filing fee.143 However, her appeal was not accepted because
she was unable to pay substantial, additional state-mandated costs.144 M.L.B.
then requested permission to appeal in forma pauperis145 from the Supreme
Court of Mississippi.146 The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her
request.147 M.L.B. appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States,
arguing that the state of Mississippi deprived her of a fundamental right—
her parental relationship with her children—and that the constitutional
ideals of basic fairness and equal protection under the law required she be
allowed the right of appellate review regardless of her ability to pre-pay the
associated costs.148

138

Id. at 285 (documenting that 43.8% of civil human trafficking defendants in 2018 were
entities (171 entities)); 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
139
See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127–28 (1996).
140
Id. at 107.
141
Id. at 105 (detailing that four justices joined in the Court’s opinion, written by Justice
Ginsburg; Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment; and Justice Thomas, joined by
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, dissented).
142
Id. at 106.
143
Id. at 108.
144
Id. at 108–09 (stating additional $2,352.36 due to cover the costs of preparing and
transmitting the record).
145
In Forma Pauperis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“In the manner of an
indigent who is permitted to disregard filing fees and court costs.”).
146
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 109.
147
Id.
148
Id.
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The Court held that Mississippi could not withhold the documents
necessary to meet state-mandated requirements for an appellate claim due to
M.L.B.’s inability to pay the associated costs.149 The Court considered the
applicability of the principle established in criminal cases: once a state has
established an avenue of appellate review, that state may not then bar access
to appellate review through “unreasoned distinctions that can only impede
open and equal access to the courts.”150 The Court had initially applied this
principle in cases in which loss of liberty was at stake.151 Later, it extended
this principle to criminal cases which carried the threat of serious collateral
consequences152 and to civil cases in which a fundamental interest was at
stake.153 The Court acknowledged the interest of parents in their relationship
with their children as a sufficiently fundamental right to be protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.154
The Court did not clearly indicate the grounds upon which it decided
M.L.B.;155 however, Justice Kennedy would have decided the case based solely
upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.156 The Court
reasoned that M.L.B.’s right of access to the court was barred solely by the
cost of state-mandated requirements and not by any matter over which she
had control.157 Therefore, the extension of the principle that the state may not
impede equal and open access to the courts through unreasoned distinctions
to M.L.B.’s appeal of her parental rights termination decree would not “open
[the] floodgates” to numerous other cases as the dissent and respondents
alleged.158
Justice Thomas criticized the majority opinion. He alleged that the
inevitable consequence of the decision would be the extension of the right to
access the court in civil cases to cases involving interests that rationally could
not be distinguished, based on the majority’s test, from M.L.B.’s important
parental interest in maintaining her relationship with her children.159 Justice
149

Id. at 128.
Id. at 110–11.
151
Id. at 111–12.
152
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 112.
153
Id. at 113–16 (recognizing divorce and paternity issues as fundamental interests, but
not bankruptcy or welfare benefits).
154
Id. at 119.
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See id. at 120–21, 124.
156
Id. at 129 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157
Id. at 127–28.
158
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127.
159
Id. at 129–30 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia fully joined Justice Thomas’
dissent and the Chief Justice joined all but Part II).
150
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Thomas would have held that M.L.B. was afforded her due process rights in
her original trial before the Chancery Court.160 He distinguished Boddie from
M.L.B. by their respective access to a hearing.161
Justice Thomas, joined only by Justice Scalia, also expressed his doubts
regarding the majority’s assertion that its holding would not be extended
beyond parental termination actions.162 He warned that the lack of clearly
specified decisional grounds and the ease of discovering other important
rights that could be equated to the parental rights threatened by the
termination decision in M.L.B. may lead to excessive growth of new rights
for civil litigants.163
The M.L.B. Court made its decision to extend a constitutional right of
access to the courts based on the importance of the appellant’s right.164 A sextrafficked plaintiff seeking to hold accountable third-party corporations that
allegedly knew or should have known they were profiting from the trafficking
is seeking the civil remedy granted her by Congress. This plaintiff is also
seeking to further the important public interest of reducing on-going sextrafficking by incentivizing third-party corporate awareness and action.
While it is unlikely that there will be a decision granting civil plaintiff’s a
constitutional right of access to civil courts, federal district courts face the
challenge of determining whether specific barriers to a civil plaintiff’s access
to the court should be overcome by judicial action.
A federal district court determines how to balance the defendants’ right to
put on a full and fair defense and the public’s right to open judicial
proceedings against the plaintiff’s right to access the court without fear of
harm. While a plaintiff may be allowed to proceed under a pseudonym in
most cases, it is not a guaranteed right based on the plaintiff meeting specific,
consistent criteria. A district court bears the ultimate responsibility to
determine whether to allow the plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym in
court documents and whether to extend the protection of the plaintiff’s
identity to the discovery process. The precedent under which a federal district
court makes this determination varies depending on the circuit within which
it sits.
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Id. at 132.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 143–44.
See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127–28 (majority opinion).
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III. THREE CASES, THREE OUTCOMES
The plaintiffs in the following cases all alleged they survived sextrafficking and all brought their actions for damages against defendant thirdparty corporations under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 as enacted by the federal William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA).165 Each plaintiff alleged she was trafficked at hotels and two alleged
they were advertised for commercial sex on public websites.166 Although their
specific allegations of abuse while being trafficked differ slightly and the
duration of their trafficking varied from one month to fifteen years,167 their
allegations that the defendant corporations profited from sex-trafficking the
defendant corporations knew or should have known was occurring on their
property are the same.168 Each suit necessarily has differences in how the
complaints, motions, and replies were presented and argued, but the core
question of how federal courts should evaluate whether and to what extent to
grant a sex-trafficked plaintiff’s request for a protective order to protect her
true identity remains the same.
A.

Ohio: M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.

In M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (M.A. v. Wyndham)—the first
civil suit filed by a sex-trafficked plaintiff against hotels under the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act169—the plaintiff, M.A., alleged that the hospitality
industry defendants “knowingly benefited” for more than a year from her
trafficker selling her for sex on defendants’ properties and thereby knowingly
“participat[ed] in a venture . . . engaged in illegal sex trafficking” in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).170 Shortly after filing the suit, M.A. filed a motion
for a protective order requesting the court grant her permission to proceed
under a pseudonym during the litigation and protect her identity by
prohibiting the disclosure of her identity, requiring information regarding
her identity be redacted from any filed documents, and requiring unredacted

165

M.A. Complaint, supra note 9, at 4; A.D. Complaint, supra note 9, at 1; Craigslist
Complaint, supra note 9, at 5–6 (bringing action under Washington state law as well).
166
M.A. Complaint, supra note 9, at 3–4; A.D. Complaint, supra note 9, at 2; Craigslist
Complaint, supra note 9, at 4.
167
M.A. Complaint, supra note 9, at 4; A.D. Complaint, supra note 9, at 2; M.L. v.
Craigslist Inc., No. 3:19-CV-06153, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223297, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
16, 2021).
168
M.A. Complaint, supra note 9, at 4; A.D. Complaint, supra note 9, at 2; Craigslist
Complaint, supra note 9, at 20.
169
Rothberg, supra note 7, at 285.
170
M.A. Complaint, supra note 9, at 35; id. at 4.
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documents to be filed under seal.171 M.A. argued that the court could excuse
her from identifying herself publicly because her “privacy interests
substantially outweigh[ed] the presumption of open judicial proceedings.”172
M.A. identified her privacy interest as the compelled disclosure during
litigation of information “of the utmost intimacy” due to forced sexual
encounters that occurred while she was trafficked.173
M.A. compared her request for a protective order to orders granted to
protect survivors of sex-trafficking in criminal cases and pseudonymous
protection granted to survivors of sexual battery and rape.174 She alleged that
all of these cases share the common characteristic of requiring the disclosure
of highly personal information that may expose the survivor to further
trauma such as public ridicule, potential future harm, and online association
with rape and torture.175 M.A. asserted that her privacy rights could be
protected without prejudicing the defendants because she would reveal her
true identity to the defendants for the limited purpose of investigating her
claims.176
1.
Stipulated Protective Order
Prior to the defendants’ court ordered response deadline,177 the parties
agreed to a stipulated protective order that the court approved.178 The court
then denied M.A.’s Motion for a Protective Order as moot.179 The stipulated
protective order provided that M.A. would provide her current identity and
identifying information (collectively: true identity) to the defendants’
counsel, M.A. would be allowed to proceed under pseudonym for the
duration of the litigation, all parties would keep M.A.’s true identity
confidential during and after the litigation, and all parties would redact

171
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Protective Order at 2, M.A. v. Wyndham, No. 2:19-CV-00849
(S.D. Ohio May 7, 2019).
172
Id. at 3 (quoting Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004)).
173
Id. at 3–4 (quoting Porter, 370 F.3d at 560).
174
Id. at 4.
175
Id. at 4–5.
176
Id. at 5.
177
Order at 1, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-00849 (S.D. Ohio
May 28, 2019) (granting Wyndham until June 10, 2019, to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Protective Order).
178
Stipulated Protective Order at 1, 7, M.A. v. Wyndham, No. 2:19-CV-00849 (S.D. Ohio
June 4, 2019).
179
Order at 1, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-00849 (S.D. Ohio
June 11, 2019) (denying as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order).
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information about M.A.’s true identity from court filings.180 The stipulated
protective order further provided a list of persons to whom the parties could
disclose M.A.’s true identity and the circumstances in which that information
could be disclosed.181
2.

Modification of the Stipulated Protective Order

A year later, M.A. again petitioned the court for a protective order—this
time to prevent the defendants from voluntarily disclosing her true identity
to her traffickers.182 In that motion, M.A. raised the question of whether a
sex-trafficked plaintiff must sacrifice protections granted to crime victims
under federal and state law and be exposed to potential endangerment due to
a defendant’s decision to disclose her true identity simply because she filed
the civil suit.183 She alleged that the issue of voluntary disclosure of her true
identity to her traffickers or their associates arose after the entry of the
stipulated protected order when “one or more of the Defendants proposed
directly approaching the Plaintiff’s trafficker(s) during the course of
discovery.”184
Because M.A. did not directly request a new protective order in her
motion, the court characterized her request as a modification of the existing
stipulated protective order.185 The court described M.A.’s proposed
modification as a request that her traffickers or the traffickers’ affiliates be
excluded from the fact witnesses to whom her true identity could be disclosed
if her true identity would aid that witness in “recalling, relating, or explaining
facts or in testifying.”186 M.A. also requested the court to require that other
persons or entities needed to litigate any claims or defenses sign an
acknowledgment and agreement to be bound by the protective order before
the defendant disclosed the plaintiff’s true identity.187
180

Stipulated Protective Order at 1–3, M.A. v. Wyndham, No. 2:19-CV-00849 (S.D. Ohio
June 5, 2019).
181
Id. at 2–3 (allowing disclosure to persons intimately involved or retained in
connection with the suit, potential and actual fact witnesses as needed, custodian of records,
government agencies and personnel if necessary, and other persons or parties upon consent
of the parties).
182
Plaintiff M.A.’s Motion for a Protective Order to Prevent the Voluntary Disclosure of
Plaintiff’s Identity to her Trafficker(s) at 1, M.A. v. Wyndham, No. 2:19-CV-00849 (S.D.
Ohio June 23, 2020).
183
Id. at 3.
184
Id. at 10.
185
M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-00849, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
165293, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2020).
186
Id. at *5.
187
Id.
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The court framed the issue before it as a requested modification to an
existing stipulated protective order approved by the court. The court cited
Sixth Circuit precedent which required M.A. to show good cause for
modification of the protective order by “articulat[ing] ‘specific facts’ showing
the risk of a ‘clearly defined and serious injury.’”188 These specific facts must
be more than “mere speculation or unsubstantiated fears of prejudice” if the
protective order would burden the defendants’ trial preparation.189 The court
then noted that other trial courts within the Sixth Circuit had applied a
heightened burden to a party seeking modification of a protective order to
which that party had previously agreed.190
The court found that, regardless of the level of burden applied, M.A. failed
to establish good cause for modification of the stipulated protective order
entered into in June 2019.191 Therefore, the court denied M.A.’s motion for a
protective order.192 The court stated that M.A. did not establish good cause
because she did not show compelling circumstances or any specific risk from
her trafficker during the past year that would militate for the requested
increase in protection.193 The court particularly noted that the plaintiff did
not clearly request specific modifications to the protective order that would
meet her safety needs and also meet the defendants’ need to engage in
meaningful discovery.194
B.

Virginia: A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.

In A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (A.D. v. Wyndham), filed just
nine months after the first suit, A.D. alleged she was trafficked for sex on
Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, Inc. (Wyndham) properties for one month in
2012 and that Wyndham “knowingly benefited from facilitating a venture
that they knew, or . . . should have known, to be engag[ed] in sex
trafficking.”195 A.D. filed her motion for a protective order that same day.196
In it, she requested that she be allowed to proceed under a pseudonym and
that the defendant keep her identity confidential throughout the suit and

188

Id. at *5–7 (quoting Nix v. Sword, 11 F. App’x 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001)).
M.A. v. Wyndham, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165293, at *6 (citing Nemir v. Mitsubishi
Motors Corp., 381 F.3d 540, 550–51 (6th Cir. 2004)).
190
Id. at *7.
191
Id. at *13.
192
Id.
193
Id. at *11–12.
194
Id. at *12.
195
A.D. Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
196
A.D. Protective Order Request, supra note 12, at 1.
189

2022]

PRE-TRIAL PROTECTIVE ORDERS

475

thereafter.197 She based her motion for a protective order on her fear of
physical retaliation from her still at-large trafficker;198 her fear of being
stigmatized as a sex-trafficking survivor if her highly sensitive, personal, and
private identifying information were disseminated;199 her psychological
vulnerability to being revictimized by being deprived of “her privacy,
autonomy, and sense [of] normalcy” once again—this time through
litigation.200
The court granted her leave to proceed anonymously and her motion for
the protective order.201 The court then ordered the parties to confer and agree
upon a protective order consistent with its opinion.202 In its opinion, the court
specified that “[t]he protective order must allow Defendant full access to
Plaintiffs identity and the identity of her alleged trafficker, and for Defendant
to utilize this information in discovery.”203 Further, the court required the
protective order to provide for redaction of that identifying information from
publicly filed documents.204
The parties were unable to agree upon a protective order due to different
interpretations of the scope of the provision stating the protective order must
allow the “Defendant to utilize this information in discovery.”205 A.D.
petitioned the court, requesting clarification of the court’s March 20, 2020
order.206 She also proposed a protective order that would prohibit disclosure
of her identity to her alleged trafficker or associates at any time, restrict
disclosure of her trafficker’s name during discovery, and restrict Wyndham’s

197

Id.
Id. at 4.
199
Id. at 1–2.
200
Id. at 5.
201
A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00120, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
163851, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2020).
202
Id. at *8.
203
Id. at *7.
204
Id.
205
Id.; see Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification and Entry of Protective Order, A.D. v.
Wyndham, No. 4:19-CV-00120 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2020); Defendant Wyndham Hotels &
Resorts, Inc.’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification, A.D. v. Wyndham, No. 4:19CV-00120 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2020).
206
Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification and Entry of Protective Order, supra note 205, at 4.
198
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ability to contact her alleged trafficker.207 After considering the parties’
interests and needs, the court issued a protective order.208
Wyndham then requested the court reconsider the protective order
because the protective order prejudiced its investigation during discovery.209
Wyndham objected to the restriction requiring it to request information
about A.D. or her alleged traffickers from non-party witnesses only at a
deposition.210 Wyndham further objected to the requirement that it notify
A.D. of its intention to contact her alleged traffickers, explain what
information it sought, and why it needed to disclose her true identity.211 The
court issued an amended protective order.212
1.

Fourth Circuit Standard: Granting Leave to Proceed
Anonymously

The court weighed the interests of the parties and the public in granting
and amending these protective orders. In granting A.D.’s Motion for
Protective Order and Leave to Proceed Anonymously, the court determined
that A.D.’s interest in proceeding anonymously outweighed the public’s
interest in open judicial proceedings and the risk of prejudice to
Wyndham.213 The court primarily based this decision on two cases. The first,
a Fourth Circuit case—James v. Jacobson, grants courts the discretion to allow
parties to proceed under pseudonyms despite the presumption of open
judicial proceedings.214
The court exercised this discretion based on the five considerations laid
out in Candidate No. 452207 v. CFA Inst., an Eastern District of Virginia
case.215 These considerations are as follows:

207

Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief for Protective Order and Leave to Withhold Identity of
Her Traffickers or Limit the Use of Their Identities in Litigation at 2, A.D. v. Wyndham, No.
4:19-CV-00120 (E.D. Va. June 9, 2020).
208
A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00120, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
250671, at *5 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2020).
209
A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00120, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
250685, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2020).
210
Id. at *4.
211
Id.
212
Id. at *2.
213
A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00120, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
163851, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2020) (granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order and
Leave to Proceed Anonymously).
214
Id. at *3 (citing Candidate No. 452207 v. CFA Inst., 42 F. Supp. 3d 804, 806 (E.D. Va.
2012); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993)).
215
A.D. v. Wyndham, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163851, at *2–4.
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(1) “whether the justification asserted by the requesting
party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that
may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter
of sensitive and highly personal nature;” (2) “whether
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental
harm to the requesting party or . . . innocent non-parties;”
(3) “the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are
sought to be protected;” (4) “whether the action is against a
governmental or private party;” and (5) “the risk of
unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action
against it to proceed anonymously.”216
The court concluded that there was very little risk of prejudice to Wyndham
in allowing A.D. to proceed under a pseudonym because A.D.’s identity
would only be concealed from the public.217
2.

Court Issued Protective Order and Amended Protective
Order

After the parties failed to agree on a stipulated protective order that would
meet the guidelines the court laid out in its March 20, 2020 order, the court’s
opinion which accompanied its first protective order recognized A.D.’s
privacy and safety concerns while also clarifying that A.D. must give
Wyndham enough information to investigate the alleged trafficking that
occurred on its properties.218 Wyndham contested three provisions of the
first protective order.219 The court addressed each provision separately and
chose to amend two provisions.220
The court acknowledged that the first protective order may have restricted
Wyndham’s ability to adequately investigate and defend against the instant
claims.221 Therefore, it amended the protective order to allow Wyndham to
disclose A.D.’s identity to fact witnesses other than A.D.’s alleged traffickers
or their associates as needed.222 The court also acknowledged that requiring
216
Id. at *3–4 (quoting Candidate No. 452207, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 807 (quoting James, 6
F.3d at 238)).
217
Id. at *5–6.
218
A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00120, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
250671, at *2–5 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2020).
219
See A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00120, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 250685, at *4–7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2020).
220
Id. at *4–8.
221
Id. at *5.
222
Amended Protective Order, A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19-CV00120, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250687, at *3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2020).
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Wyndham to notify A.D. to explain what information it was seeking and why
it was seeking that information might infringe on Wyndham’s privileged
work product and require Wyndham to disclose pre-trial strategy to A.D.223
Therefore, the court amended the protective order to require Wyndham to
inform the court if it intended to contact A.D.’s alleged traffickers and
disclose her identity to them, to explain to the court what information it
sought and why it was necessary, and to refrain from disclosing A.D.’s
identifying information unless necessary for discovery and then only at the
time of the interview, deposition, or testimony.224
However, the court refused to modify the provision requiring Wyndham
to acquire a witness’s signature on a written agreement indicating the witness
had reviewed the protective order and agreed to keep the protected
information confidential.225 The court reasoned that the importance of
protecting A.D.’s identity balanced against Wyndham’s need to investigate
justified the requirement of a witness’s signature.226 Indeed, the court noted
that a witness’s refusal to sign such an agreement would be an indication that
the witness intended to disclose the protected information to others.227
The court emphasized that the amended protective order was its final
decision on these matters, citing the significant effort it put forth to balance
A.D.’s “serious and significant risk of harm” against Wyndham’s need to fully
investigate A.D.’s claims in order to put forth a full and fair defense.228 The
parties and the court expended significant time and energy as shown by the
over two dozen documents, orders, and memorandums produced before the
amended protective order was finalized.229 The parties later settled.230 The
amount of time and effort expended by parties and the court illustrates the
grave importance of the ongoing litigation regarding the protection of a sextrafficked plaintiff’s true identity in court filings and discovery.

223

A.D. v. Wyndham, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250685, at *8.
See Amended Protective Order, A.D. v. Wyndham, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250687.
225
A.D. v. Wyndham, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250685, at *6.
226
Id. at *6–7.
227
Id. at *7.
228
Id. at *9.
229
U.S. District Court Docket, A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 4:19-CV00120 (E.D. Va. dismissed Oct. 8, 2021).
230
Final Order, A.D. v. Wyndham, No. 4:19-CV-00120 (E.D. Va. Oct. 8, 2021) (stating
the court dismissed the action with prejudice upon the parties “Joint Notice of Stipulated
Dismissal With Prejudice”).
224
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Washington: M.L. v. Craigslist, Inc.

On the same day A.D. filed her complaint in Virginia, M.L. filed her
complaint in Washington state against Craigslist, Inc., Wyndham Hotels &
Resorts, Inc., and various Seattle-Tacoma area hotels.231 One of M.L.’s
traffickers was already convicted and imprisoned at the time the lawsuit was
filed, but at least one trafficker was still at large.232 M.L. “was trafficked
continually between the ages of 12 and 18 years of age, and beyond” until she
was 26 years old.233 M.L. alleged the defendants knew sex-traffickers used
their legitimate businesses, profited by facilitating that sex-trafficking, and
chose not to take “timely and effective measures to thwart [the] epidemic” of
sex-trafficking.234 The parties raised the issue of a protective order at the
March 10, 2020 status conference and were directed to meet and confer
regarding the possible protective order.235 In the meantime, the parties agreed
not to contact M.L’s trafficker during the pendency of the protective order.236
After two more status conferences between the parties and the court
regarding the protective order, defendants and M.L. filed separate motions
for protective orders with the court.237 In her brief accompanied by her
proposed protective order, M.L. requested her identity be kept confidential
during and after the prosecution of the lawsuit so that she would not be
exposed to an “unreasonable risk of embarrassment, humiliation, or
danger.”238 She proposed that confidentiality could be maintained by
procedures for and limitations on disclosure during discovery that would
prohibit defendants from disclosing M.L.’s true identity to her traffickers or

231

Craigslist Complaint, supra note 9, at 1–2.
Id. at 36; Plaintiff’s Protective Order Brief at 7, M.L. v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 3:19-cv06153 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2020).
233
First Amended Complaint for Damages at 20, M.L. v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 3:19-cv06153 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 2, 2019); Craigslist Complaint, supra note 9, at 21.
234
Craigslist Complaint, supra note 9, at 1–2.
235
Minute Entry, Craigslist, No. 3:19-cv-06153 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2020) (PACER),
ECF No. 55.
236
Id.
237
Minute Entry, Craigslist, No. 3:19-cv-06153 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 07, 2020) (PACER),
ECF No. 60; Minute Entry, Craigslist, No. 3:19-cv-06153 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2020)
(PACER), ECF No. 84; Defendant Craigslist, Inc. Motion for Protective Order, Craigslist,
No. 3:19-cv-06153 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2020); Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
Motion for Protective Order, Craigslist, No. 3:19-cv-06153 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2020);
Defendant G6 Hospitality, LLC Motion for Protective Order, Craigslist, No. 3:19-cv-06153
(W.D. Wash. May 15, 2020); Plaintiff M.L. Motion for Protective Order, Craigslist, No. 3:19cv-06153 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2020).
238
Plaintiff’s Protective Order Brief, supra note 232, at 1.
232
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their affiliates.239 M.L. expressed particular concern about being harassed,
intimidated, or physically or psychologically harmed if any of her traffickers
who were not incarcerated discovered her current identity and location.240
1.

Protective Order

The court allowed M.L. to proceed under a pseudonym in filings and
public court proceedings and ordered the parties to seek an order from the
court to safeguard M.L.’s identity by seal or redaction if they encountered a
legitimate need to identify her.241 Further, the court protected M.L.’s identity
during discovery by ordering that information comprising her true identity
could only be disclosed to a limited number of persons as required for
discovery.242 Specifically, Section 3(c)(11) allowed parties to disclose M.L.’s
true identity to “any potential, anticipated, or actual fact witness, and their
counsel, but only to the extent plaintiff’s true identity will assist the witness
in recalling, relating, or explaining facts.”243
The court decided to allow M.L. to proceed pseudonymously because the
balance of factors under Ninth Circuit precedent “show[ed] the plaintiff’s
need for protection of her identity outweigh[ed] the potential prejudice to
the defendants.”244 The federal district court balanced the following five
factors:
(1) the severity of the threatened harm, (2) the
reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears, . . . (3) the
anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation, (4) the
prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) the public interest.245
The court found that M.L.’s allegations in her Amended Complaint were
“sufficient to show the severity of the potential harm is immense, and M.L.’s
fear of harm if these individuals find out who she is, or where she works, or
where she resides, is reasonable.”246 Further, M.L. established her particular
239

Id. at 3, 9.
Id. at 9.
241
Protective Order, Craigslist, No. 3:19-cv-06153, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250732, at *3–4
(W.D. Wash. July 8, 2020).
242
Id. at *5–7 (allowing disclosure to persons intimately involved or retained in
connection with the suit, potential and actual fact witnesses as needed, custodian of records,
and government agencies and personnel if necessary).
243
Id. at *7.
244
M.L. v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-06153, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250724, at *7 (W.D.
Wash. July 8, 2020) (citing Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Ests., 596 F.3d
1036, 1042–45 (9th Cir. 2010)).
245
Id. at *4 (quoting Kamehameha, 596 F.3d at 1042–45).
246
Id. at *5.
240
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vulnerability to retaliation through stigmatization, social or employment
discrimination, or direct harm from her traffickers or their associates by
alleging she was involuntarily sex-trafficked for many years, both as a child
and as an adult.247
In order to reduce prejudice to the defendants, the court narrowly tailored
its protective order to address specific privacy concerns regarding disclosure
of M.L.’s true identity.248 To further address any potential prejudice, the court
also specifically allowed for modification of the protective order by
agreement or court order and also considered appointing a Special Master.249
The court considered the public’s interest, both in open judicial proceedings
and in the defendants’ ability to present a full and fair defense.250 However,
the court found the need to protect sex-trafficked victims from further harm
during the course of discovery and litigation was “also an extraordinarily
strong public interest.”251
2.

Modified Protective Order

M.L. objected to the specifics of Section 3(c)(11), alleging that allowing
unlimited disclosure of her true identity to “any potential, anticipated, or
actual fact witness, and their counsel, . . .” conflicted with the stated goal to
balance the parties’ competing interests while also providing her with
meaningful protection.252 She requested stronger protections such as
requiring consent of the parties, a witness’s signature on an
acknowledgement to be bound from dissemination of disclosed information,
and a specific exception regarding disclosure to her traffickers or their
affiliates.253

247

See id.
Id. at *5–6.
249
Id. at *6.
250
Craigslist, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250724, at *6–7.
251
Id. (citing Plaintiff B. v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1315–19 (11th Cir. 2011) (recognizing
privacy interests regarding identity of juvenile plaintiffs because of coerced and recorded
graphic sexual activity); Roe v. United States, No. 1:19-cv-00270-DAD-BAM, 2020 WL
869153 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) (recognizing privacy of mental health information)).
252
Plaintiff’s Motion for Modification or Objection to the Protective Order at 1–2,
Craigslist, No. 3:19-cv-06153 (W.D. Wash. July 22, 2020) (quoting Protective Order,
Craigslist, No. 3:19-cv-06153, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250732, at *7 (W.D. Wash. July 8,
2020)).
253
Id. at 4.
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The court considered M.L.’s request and the defendants’ responses before
modifying the protective order.254 The court specifically described the goal of
the protective order as
preventing plaintiff’s “sex trafficking perpetrator(s) [from]
obtain[ing] information about her identity, contact
information, location of her residence, or other private
information” while also allowing defendants a meaningful
recourse to disclose plaintiff’s identity to plaintiff’s known
traffickers or traffickers’ known affiliates, if necessary,
through either an agreement of the parties, a contested
motion to the Court, or resort to a Special Master under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 53.255
Therefore, the court modified Section 3(c)(11) to include an exception for
M.L.’s known traffickers or their affiliates (traffickers).256 The court required
the party seeking to disclose M.L.’s true identity to her traffickers to submit a
request and obtain a court order before making any disclosure.257 That
request could be submitted either as a stipulated motion or a contested
motion that described the circumstances surrounding the proposed
disclosure to the court.258 The court clarified that the modified protective
order prohibited the parties from disclosing M.L.’s true identity to anyone
not listed in the protective order without an order allowing such disclosure.259
The court reasoned that these modifications fulfilled the goal of protecting
M.L. while also allowing defendants reasonable recourse to disclose her true
identity if necessary.260
The defendants raised various objections to these modifications, but the
court denied those objections.261 They challenged the modifications as
contrary to law based on impairment of discovery, forced disclosure of work
product, and allegations that M.L. did not show sufficient, specific good
cause.262 The district court found that the modifications were not clearly
254
See M.L. v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-06153, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 250723 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 3, 2020).
255
Id. at *7.
256
Id. at *7–8.
257
Id. at *8.
258
Id. at *7–8.
259
Id.
260
Craigslist, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 250723, at *6–7.
261
M.L. v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-06153, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175472, at *6–9
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2020).
262
Id.
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erroneous or contrary to law by impairing discovery or forcing disclosure of
work product because the magistrate judge had “carefully and thoughtfully
balanced the concerns of all parties in the modification.” 263 The district court
also found that the modifications were not contrary to law because M.L. had
articulated her reasoning in her request for modification of the protective
order.264 This articulated reasoning was sufficient to support the modification
because Ninth Circuit precedent requires substantiation of allegations of
harm by either specific examples or articulated reasoning.265
IV. PROPOSED RECONCILIATION OF STANDARDS FOR PLAINTIFF IDENTITY
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
The District Court for the Western District of Washington noted that
district court judges in similar cases acted within their discretion by
balancing their parties’ competing interests and issuing case-specific
protective orders.266 This directly addressed Craigslist’s arguments, similar to
those raised by other parties in other cases, that there should be some
consistency in the requirements of protective orders regarding the disclosure
of the plaintiff’s true identity across federal district courts hearing similar
cases.267 This expectation or desire for consistency becomes particularly
meaningful upon realization that Wyndham is a defendant in all three of the
cases considered here.268 Therefore, Wyndham is being required to litigate at
least three ongoing lawsuits in three different federal district courts under
three different protective orders.269
It is important to remember that each protective order is based on the
discretion of the court and is responsive to the specific parameters of the
case.270 However, many of the variations between the protective orders can
be ascribed to differences in procedure; the basis of the request; and the
specific order or timing of the requests, modifications, or amendments to the
protective order. A Model Protective Order271 would provide plaintiffs and
263

Id. at *9.
Id. at *7–8 (citing Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.
1992)).
265
Id.
266
Id. at *10.
267
See Craigslist, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175472, at *10.
268
M.A. Complaint, supra note 9, at 1; A.D. Complaint, supra note 9, at 1; Craigslist
Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
269
See M.A. Complaint, supra note 9, at 1; A.D. Complaint, supra note 9, at 1; Craigslist
Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
270
See discussion supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.
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See infra Appendix A.
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defendants with common ground from which to begin during their required
FRCP 26 conference.272
A.

Allowing Sex-Trafficked Plaintiff to Proceed Under a Pseudonym

All the courts above allowed the plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym
during the litigation. This protected the confidentiality of plaintiff’s true
identity during and after litigation, in court filings, and public court
proceedings. In each case the plaintiff recognized and agreed that choosing
to file suit meant she must disclose her true identity and that of any traffickers
to the defendants. The court’s decision to allow the sex-trafficked plaintiff to
proceed under a pseudonym is a necessary, but not sufficient, step towards
providing increased safety from retaliation to the sex-trafficked plaintiff.273
B.

Protecting Plaintiff Identity and Identifying Information in Discovery

The real conflict is occurring in the question of how and to what extent
the plaintiff’s true identity should be protected during discovery. Plaintiffs
are understandably wary of potential misuse of their identifying information
during discovery as a means for the defendant to annoy, embarrass, oppress,
or unduly burden them by disclosing their identity or sufficient identifying
information to third parties. Sex-trafficked plaintiffs fear they may be socially
or economically stigmatized by their community if that community learns of
their status as formerly sex-trafficked persons. They also fear physical harm
to themselves or their loved ones from their trafficker, their trafficker’s
friends, or their trafficker’s gang.274 Further, unnecessary confrontation with
persons associated with the plaintiffs’ time being trafficked may cause further
psychological trauma when they are already vulnerable and traumatized.275

272

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (requiring certification that the moving party has conferred or
attempted to confer in good faith with other affected parties before moving for a protective
order).
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See Rachel J. Wechsler, Deliberating at a Crossroads: Sex Trafficking Victims’ Decisions
About Participating in the Criminal Justice Process, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1033, 1062 (2020)
(recognizing the risk of potential retaliation against victims identified by name in official
documents in the Netherlands).
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Id. at 1049–50 (relating fear of violent retaliation as an important concern due to past
violence, weapons possession, or past threats of future violence).
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Elizabeth M. Donovan, Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act and Stop Enabling Sex
Traffickers Act: A Shield for Jane Doe, 52 CONN. L. REV. 85, 94–97 (2020) (citing a 2014 study
of health consequences of female domestic sex-trafficking victims where almost all study
participants reported at least one psychological issue while trafficked and high rates of
attempted suicide).
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Utilizing a Master

A potential solution to resolve party disputes regarding disclosure of the
plaintiff’s true identity during discovery is a court appointed master under
FRCP 53. A master would benefit the parties and the court through the
increased, focused time the master could spend examining and considering
the parties arguments regarding the necessity of a particular disclosure. This
attention to detail would ensure the parties’ and public’s interests were
carefully balanced in each decision by a neutral specialist. While a master
could significantly increase discovery costs for the parties,276 the master may
choose to serve pro bono because of the importance of protecting a sextrafficked victim from further harm during discovery while protecting the
defendant’s right to fully investigate the allegations in order to prepare a full
and fair defense. The option of a master serving pro bono makes utilization
of a master a viable and attractive choice for managing these complex
discovery issues.
V. CONCLUSION
As the court in M.L. v. Wyndham so astutely noted, the need to protect a
sex-trafficked survivor from further harm during litigation is not just the sextrafficked plaintiff’s interest but is also an “extraordinarily strong public
interest.”277 Congress could declare that sex-trafficked victims that seek civil
remedies under the current version of the TVPRA have the right to specific
protections related to disclosure of their true identities during discovery.
Short of that specific congressional action, until the Supreme Court or
Congress declares that civil plaintiffs have a right to access the courts without
fear of harm and enact protections, the district and circuit courts must
continue to determine which barriers to litigation are unreasonable.
It is possible to balance the plaintiff’s interest in safely accessing the court
to press her claim, the defendant’s interest in thoroughly investigating the
plaintiff’s claim through discovery, the public’s interest in open judicial
proceedings, and the public’s interest in protecting vulnerable plaintiffs from
further harm during litigation. The resulting model protective order is not
simple and fully pleases neither the sex-trafficked plaintiff nor the defendant
corporations, but it does maximize protection for the sex-trafficked plaintiff
while allowing the corporate defendants recourse to the courts by motion or
court-appointed master to facilitate needed discovery.
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See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g).
M.L. v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-06153, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250724, at *7 (W.D.
Wash. July 8, 2020).
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It is time for the judicial system to recognize the significant barriers that
restrict access to the courts for sex-trafficked individuals, regardless of age;
and its need to facilitate, to the best of their ability, a method of discovery that
protects the identity and future of the sex-trafficked plaintiff while also
providing the defendant corporation with sufficient opportunity to
investigate the claims against them.
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APPENDIX A
Proposed Model Protective Order278
1.

Protection of Plaintiff’s Identity in Public Court Records and Public
Proceedings

The Court finds a compelling interest in plaintiff’s privacy and safety, and
that a protective order is necessary for plaintiff to avoid having the sextrafficking perpetrator(s) obtain information about her identity, contact
information, location of her residence, or other private information. The
Court will allow plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously under the initials
“[X.X.]” or “plaintiff” in all filings and all public Court proceedings.
The parties shall refer to plaintiff’s alleged trafficker as “Alleged
Trafficker” in all public filings. In the case of multiple alleged traffickers, the
parties shall refer to them as “Alleged Trafficker A,” “Alleged Trafficker B,”
etc., and these designations shall remain consistent throughout all filings in
these proceedings.
If any party or third-party has access to information about plaintiff’s
identity and asserts a need to identify the plaintiff during a public Court
proceeding or in a public filing, that Party or third-party is required, before
making any identifying communication, to seek an order from the Court to
seal the proceeding, and/or file a redacted document, or file a motion to seal
the record. If any party or third-party has questions about whether any
forthcoming filing or communication in connection with a Court proceeding
is in compliance with the requirements of this Protective Order, they should
move the Court for a determination of compliance prior to submitting any
such filing or making any such communication. The parties, as well as their
agents, employees, and assigns, shall not disclose plaintiff’s true identity
during or after the conclusion of this matter.
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All material contained in this section is copied, compiled, and edited from language
used in various protective orders and proposed protective orders. See generally Proposed
Protective Order, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00849 (S.D. Ohio
May 7, 2019), ECF No. 44-1; Stipulated Protective Order, M.A., No. 2:19-cv-00849 (S.D.
Ohio June 5, 2019), ECF No. 60-1; Protective Order, A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts,
Inc., No. 4:19-cv-120 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2020); Amended Protective Order, A.D., No. 4:19-cv120 (E.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2020); Protective Order, M.L. v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-06153
(W.D. Wash. July 8, 2020); Order Modifying Protective Order Concerning Plaintiff’s
Identity, M.L., No. 3:19-cv-06153 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 3, 2020).
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Protection for Plaintiff’s Identity During Discovery and Case
Preparation

Counsel for plaintiff shall provide to the respective counsel for the
defendants the plaintiff’s true identity and identifying information upon the
entry of this Protective Order by the Court. As used in this Protective Order,
the term “true identity” includes:
(A) Name and any alias names used at any time;
(B) Date of birth;
(C) Social Security Number;
(D) Current address and any prior addresses of residence from [year]
to present; and
(E) Information, data, or tangible items that would physically or
electronically allow direct or indirect access to: plaintiff’s name, alias
name(s), date of birth, Social Security Number, identifying physical attributes
such as biometric data or photographs showing unique physical attributes of
plaintiff, physical address of residence or workplace, or other personal private
identification information which by a reasonable probability could be used
to identify or locate plaintiff.
Plaintiff shall clearly mark any materials or information that contain
plaintiff’s true identity with the term “TRUE IDENTITY” and the parties
shall follow the procedures and requirements of this Protective Order
concerning any materials or information containing references to plaintiff’s
true identity.
The parties are prohibited from disclosing plaintiff’s true identity to any
person or entity other than those listed in this Protective Order. If the parties
believe they have good cause to make a disclosure that is not authorized
under the terms of this Protective Order, they may bring a motion to the
Court for an order allowing disclosure.
Parties may disclose plaintiff’s true identity to the following:
(1) the parties to this litigation, including any employees, agents, and
representatives of the parties as needed to litigate any claims or defenses;
(2) counsel for the parties and employees, agents, and representatives
of counsel as needed to litigate any claims or defenses;
(3) the Court, court personnel, and members of the jury;
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(4) court reporters, recorders, and videographers engaged for
depositions, but before any disclosure to such persons, the person must sign
the acknowledgement and agreement to be bound;
(5) any mediator appointed by the Court or jointly selected by the
parties;
(6) any expert witness, outside consultant, or investigator, retained
by counsel for a party specifically in connection with this litigation, but
plaintiff’s true identity may be disclosed to such individual(s) only to the
extent that plaintiff’s true identity will assist the individual(s) in the scope of
their work with counsel in connection with this case;
(7) any custodian of records, but only to the extent that plaintiff’s
true identity will assist the custodian in obtaining and producing records;
(8) independent providers of document reproduction, electronic
discovery, or other litigation services retained or employed specifically in
connection with this litigation, but before any disclosure to such
individual(s), the individual must sign the acknowledgement and agreement
to be bound;
(9) government agencies and agency personnel, but only to the
extent that the disclosure of plaintiff’s true identity is necessary to litigate any
claims or defenses or to comply with any obligations or requirements;
(10) insurers for any of the parties, including coverage counsel for
the insurers, who may provide indemnity or other coverage in connection
with claims asserted in this case, but before any disclosure to such
individual(s), the individual must sign the acknowledgement and agreement
to be bound; and
(11) any potential, anticipated, or actual fact witness, and their
counsel, but only to the extent plaintiff’s true identity will assist the witness
in recalling, relating, or explaining facts or in testifying— except that
plaintiff’s true identity must not be disclosed to plaintiff’s known trafficker(s)
or plaintiff’s traffickers’ known affiliate(s), unless the parties follow the
procedures in sub-paragraph (12) below;
(12) plaintiff’s known trafficker(s) or plaintiff’s traffickers’ known
affiliate(s) and their counsel, but only to the extent plaintiff’s true identity
will assist the witness in recalling, relating, or explaining facts or testifying;
disclosure shall not be made prior to the time of the interview, deposition, or
testimony; such disclosure is authorized only if the party requests and obtains
a Court order before making any disclosure. The moving party must file a
motion describing the circumstances to the Court. Before filing a contested
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motion, the parties must first meet and confer, and if they reach agreement,
they may submit a stipulated motion to the Court requesting such an order.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Protective Order concerning
plaintiff’s true identity, the defendants may request from plaintiff during the
course of discovery any other information that is linked (or linkable) to the
true identity of plaintiff—such as, but not limited to: medical, educational,
financial, employment, or other information. Nothing in this Protective
Order relieves plaintiff of the obligation to produce discoverable documents
or information that plaintiff would otherwise be required to produce in the
normal course of discovery.
The protections conferred by this Protective Order do not cover
information that is in the public domain or becomes part of the public
domain through trial or otherwise.

